


# Migration and livelihood constellations: Assessing common themes in the face of environmental change in Somalia and among Agro-Pastoral peoples

David Griffith<sup>1</sup>  | Rachata Muneeppeerakul<sup>2</sup> | Genevieve Guerry<sup>1</sup> |  
 Alvaro Carmona Cabrero<sup>3</sup> | Jeffrey C. Johnson<sup>4</sup> |  
 Rafael Munoz-Carpena<sup>3</sup> | Michael Puma<sup>5</sup> | Upmanu Lall<sup>6</sup> |  
 Mehran Homayounfar<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Coastal Studies, East Carolina University,  
 Greenville, North Carolina, USA

<sup>2</sup>Florida Climate Institute, University of  
 Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

<sup>3</sup>Biological & Agricultural Engineering,  
 University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, USA

<sup>4</sup>Anthropology, University of Florida,  
 Gainesville, Florida, USA

<sup>5</sup>Center for Climate Systems Research,  
 Columbia University, New York, New York, USA

<sup>6</sup>Columbia Water Center, Columbia University,  
 New York, New York, USA

## Correspondence

David Griffith, Coastal Studies, East Carolina  
 University, Greenville, North Carolina, USA  
 Email: [griffithd@ecu.edu](mailto:griffithd@ecu.edu)

## Funding information

U.S. Army, Grant/Award Number:  
 MURIW911NF-18-1-0267

## Abstract

Research on migration has become more challenging due to at least four factors: (1) more complex migration traditions; (2) the development of migration economies that engage many types of migrants from ever more social and cultural backgrounds; (3) increasing likelihood of climate change-driven environmental migration; and (4) increasing likelihood of conflict-based migration in some contexts. These developments have shaken economic theories of migration and have encouraged interdisciplinary, methodologically mixed, qualitative and quantitative research and analysis. From a review of the literature, we have gleaned 11 common themes about environmental, economic and conflict migration that we differentiate by process (migration behaviours that are still evolving) and patterns (migration behaviours that have become customary). We then consider how positive and negative dimensions of migration can be captured and represented with close attention to livelihood constellations (multiple economic activities combined by individuals, households and families). Finally, focusing on

This is an open access article under the terms of the [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes.

© 2023 The Authors. *International Migration* published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of International Organization for Migration.

Somalia and agro-pastoral peoples generally, where recent environmental and conflict migration have been added to decades of economic migration and centuries of seasonal, environmental migration associated with pastoralism, we combine historical and qualitative work to demonstrate the value of a livelihood constellation perspective.

## INTRODUCTION

Migration means life and progress; a sedentary population stagnation.

– E.G. Ravenstein, *The Laws of Migration* (1889)

Writing about Somalia, Lewis (1994) notes that young Somali men began working in the oil industry in the United Arab Emirates (UAEs) in the 1970s, leaving pastoralist livelihoods to the care of their kinsmen while sending remittances home for a variety of capital and consumer goods, including trucks and reservoirs for herding and watering livestock. This process was responsible “for reducing nomadic mobility and the range of grazing movements and thus encouraging partial sedentarization and the formation of small rural trading posts” (1994: 122). The emigration also caused labour shortages in Somali pastoralism, leading to opportunities for young men with few cattle who did not emigrate to work as herdsmen for migrating relatives. Paid in cash and livestock, this allowed otherwise poor members of clans to develop their own herds.

This is an example of a migration tradition embedded in a livelihood that stimulated the development of a *livelihood constellation* (Griffith, 2021). This concept derives from the literature addressing economic strategies of peoples who have multiple livelihoods, such as combining pastoralism with small-scale trading, wage labour and reproductive labour. We use the term livelihood constellation because engaging in several economic activities requires allocating time and effort to each livelihood that, in turn, influences the time and effort dedicated to others. This suggests the metaphor of constellations, where livelihoods influence one another like heavenly bodies influence one another with gravity, light, time and other physical properties. As in Somalia, livelihood constellations that incorporate migration often connect different economies, such as pastoralism and oil, and open up opportunities for others.

Nearly all discourse addressing environmental migration acknowledges its complex relations with other forms of migration, especially economic migration (Black et al., 2011; Lindley, 2010). In this article, we consider Somali migration in light of their livelihood constellations, which include traditional, seasonal, environmental migration common among pastoralists. Engaging in environmental, economic and conflict migration, Somali and other migrants and refugees manifest many common themes that occur across migration settings around the world. Here we present these themes as “stylized facts” (SFs), or prevailing, recurring themes that researchers develop to further refine theories – in this case, theories of human migration (Hirschman, 2016). Eight of our SFs were recently discussed in an article comparing migration from Honduras and Puerto Rico following Hurricanes Mitch (1998) and María (2017) (Griffith, 2020).

We have revised these SFs based on responses to that work and additional reading, data and analysis, differentiating between them based on whether they constitute migration processes or patterns. Generally, processes are dynamic, involving human behavioural changes across time as migration trajectories develop, change, become more elaborate, or decline. By contrast, patterns, often the outcomes of processes, refer to more institutionalized or regularized, customary migration behaviours. The differences between them are sometimes subtle and, because the former often lead to the latter, can be dialectically related to one other.

## Organization of the article and methods

In as much as our SFs represent common themes in human migration studies, the following discussion constitutes a literature review like those that have been written since Ravenstein's (1889) over 130 years ago. However, by assessing our SFs with reference to Somali and agro-pastoralist migration, we draw attention to how focusing on livelihood constellations can help migration scholars tease apart complex migration scenarios where people experience environmental, economic and security stress simultaneously. These discussions suggest that both migration and the development of livelihood constellations are responses to co-variant stresses on livelihoods from environmental change, economic precarity, and, in some cases, the erosion of security with political instability and conflict. In the conclusion, we discuss how the concept of livelihood constellations can illuminate migration research, practice and policy.

The authors have been collaborating since 2018 on a project on environmental change and human migration, conducting interdisciplinary research on existing data sets on migration stocks and flows (e.g., UNHCR 2021), environmental change (e.g., Griffith, 2020; Wampler, 2020), international connections and commerce (e.g., Schon & Johnson, 2021; Shervinin, et al., 2022) and ethnographic information (e.g., Lewis, 1994). We developed our SFs during the first project year and have revised them in the years since with the aid of analyses of international migrant networks, distance between origins and destinations, changing ecosystem services and food crises, cultural affinity and other dimensions. This article synthesizes findings from those analyses using the concept of livelihood constellations, which has enabled comparing migration processes and patterns across different scales, geographies, climates and socioeconomic and cultural contexts.

## MIGRATION PROCESSES

### SF1: Migration builds on previous migration traditions, primarily by means of social networks and diasporas

Following pioneering research by Massey and España (1987), many researchers have depicted migration as a *social process* that involves constructing social networks across national and international geographies. This is ongoing and liable to result in the development of diasporas that link two or more regions so dynamically that people who have never left the sending region know (or believe they know) certain facts about the receiving region (Levitt, 2001). Thus, even without overseas experience, Somalis in refugee camps in Kenya will dream of living in Minnesota (Abdi, 2015). Anthropologists observing this developed the concept of transnationalism in the mid-1990s, which remains widely used in the migration literature today (Basch et al., 1995); it is less common in literature on refugees. Nevertheless, several studies have shown that cultural familiarity is responsible for refugee destinations as well (Fransen & de Haas, 2022).

In some settings, migration traditions have emerged due to specific natural, social, or historical conditions, such as island societies suffering from overpopulation relative to resources; former colonies with long-term labour migration relations with their mother countries; social, economic, or environmental crises; or areas that experience seasonal (or periodic) changes in the availability/ quality of natural resources necessary for maintaining livelihoods (Naess, 2013). These traditions influence where and when people migrate in response to natural environmental change, conflict, or changing economic opportunity. Hauer et al. (2020) found that victims fleeing the Japanese earthquake and tsunami of 2011 followed "the pre-existing migration system." Whitaker (2020) describes Somali Bantus seeking political asylum in Tanzania due to historical and cultural connections that smoothed paths to citizenship.

Migration traditions can also lead to dependence on migration as economies reorganize to accommodate the absence of young, working-age individuals. Similarly, migration traditions often result in migration economies, which rely on networks of smugglers, migration financing, transportation systems, housing and other resources,

as well as the policing of migration, enabling some individuals to profit from migration (Hernández-León, 2013). Migration economies often develop in concert with growing ethnic enclaves, which expand economic livelihood opportunities in receiving countries as migrants establish businesses and develop network ties to economic sectors that provide jobs to compatriots (Adji, 2015; Menjívar, 2000; Griffith, 2020). Migration economies include, too, the multiple humanitarian and government organizations that manage migration in multiple ways, from maintaining clinics, refugee camps and detention centres to crafting guestworker programs (Fassin, 2007; Gammeltoft-Hansen & Sørensen, 2013; Griffith, 2006, 2022; Hahamovitch, 2011).

As just noted, migration often results in migrant diasporas, or the dispersion of people from the same country, region, or community over multiple locations who remain linked through various forms of communication, contact, travel, remittances, stories, etc. Many migrants arrive in specific locations due to economic or political developments. For example, labour recruitment for work projects (e.g. Panama Canal construction) or work programs (e.g. the Bracero program) often results in settlement after the work is done; similarly, the politics involved with the establishment of refugee camps such as those in Kenya near its border with Somalia (e.g. Dedaab) can result in long-term attachments to not only the camps but growing ethnic enclaves in cities like Nairobi (Fransen & de Haas, 2022). Abdi (2015) has shown that various locations within the Somali diaspora, such as South Africa, have developed reputations as “stepping-stones” in a longer process of migration to a more permanent, highly desired location, such as Minnesota in the United States. Once diasporas develop, family members in diasporas often provide financing, information and other resources to potential migrants still in their home countries or refugee camps, as well as political pressure on foreign governments to address the crises that stimulated migration in the first place.

## SF2. As migration traditions/ diasporas develop, people resist migrating

Resistance to migration tends to develop after migration becomes common from a region. Although most people stay put by choice or lack of resources to move, others actively resist migrating, reflecting strong attachments to place (Schewel, 2019). Resistance implies active collective or individual reaction against some force or power. Those with more assets may resist migration more effectively than others, but Oliver-Smith's (2010, 2012) work in Peru found that resistance to internal displacement became a social movement comprised of people from multiple socioeconomic backgrounds of Andean society.

Unlike those faced with economic or environmental degradation, resisting flight from conflict is more complex. On the one hand, resistance can involve joining the conflict rather than fleeing it; on the other, having the economic resources to resist fleeing violence may be less possible with the degradation of financial systems, legal institutions, or political support. Resisting economic migration may mean accepting current, local economic opportunity, reducing consumption needs, or expanding livelihood constellations locally by taking advantage of fields, fisheries, dwellings and other natural and social resources that emigrants have abandoned. Livelihood constellations can facilitate resisting migration. For example, conflicts can provide livelihood opportunities for those joining or supplying the armed forces or assisting those fleeing the fighting, and labour scarcities from emigration can enable resistance by exerting upward pressures on wages in local economies.

## SF3. One type of migration often leads to other types of migration (e.g. international migration resulting from internal migration)

Several studies have traced dynamic relationships among various types of migration (Lindley, 2010). King et al. (2008) demonstrate that internal migration in Albania encouraged international migration after internal migrants flooded labour markets in regions of the country that bordered Italy and Greece. Those with resources, experiencing downward pressures on wages, migrated internationally for higher wages or participated in the migration economy.

Marchiori et al. (2011) found similar relationships in sub-Saharan Africa following weather anomalies, with higher rates of internal migration associated with increased international migration.

Return and transit migration usually result from other forms of migration. By return migration we refer to emigrants returning to their homelands once they perceive improved or safe conditions or have reached their economic targets abroad. Transit migration refers to moving through one country or region on the way to another, such as Syrians moving through Turkey to reach Germany or Hondurans moving through Guatemala and Mexico to reach the United States. Different types of migration, once underway, tend to create dynamic relationships among places, some of which become temporary way stations (e.g., Yemen for Somali migrants to UAE) yet others, like refugee camps, designed to be temporary, may last for generations.

Return and transit migration have important consequences for livelihoods. Return migration may introduce new technological, social, economic, or cultural opportunities that may reduce future migration; it may also facilitate migration by subsidizing livelihood constellations, stimulating more migration with more concrete information about migrant destinations (Griffith et al., 2016; Levitt, 2001; Mahler, 1995; Menjivar, 2000). In some cases, as in links between rural and urban areas in Madagascar (Tilghman, 2019), frequent return migration maintains social relationships that, in the future, may pay off in care during old age.

Transit migration often encourages economic opportunities associated with securing, policing and providing resources to migrants along migrant pathways. Demand for such services arises from concerns about the personal security of oneself, one's children and others. In such cases, transit migration may include humanitarian and recovery personnel migrating into conflict zones and regions devastated by hurricanes and other disasters (Fassin, 2007; Feldman, 2007).

#### **SF4. Migration often reduces and diversifies risk by enhancing livelihood constellations**

Migration can become a household strategy designed to reduce and diversify risk, multiplying sources of income or security by expanding household access to natural resources, humanitarian regimes and capital of various types (financial, social, cultural, etc.) (Stark & Bloom, 1985; Wood, 1982). Obviously, reducing risk is a key motive in fleeing violence, as well as leaving areas prone to flooding, drought and other environmental crises (Schon, 2020; Wrathall, 2012). Risk-reduction is a central reason that households increase the number of livelihoods they depend on to survive and become resilient, particularly when livelihood constellations extend across rural and urban economies (Ellis, 2000).

Multiplying livelihoods, or engaging in multiple economic activities at the household level, can complement reducing and diversifying risk. Some livelihoods may involve migration for wage labour and remitting earnings to the sending household. Both multiplying livelihoods and diversifying risk are often related to a lack of available credit, capital and insurance, and need not involve participation in formal economies as, say, a wage labourer. Because many of the world's migrants come from countries with large portions of their populations engaged in informal economic activities, multiplying livelihoods may involve participation in qualitatively distinct economic activities, such as wage labour and artisanal fishing. Migrants facilitate these connections with their labour, their remittances, their investments in home and recipient communities, their payments to representatives of migration economies, etc. Each connection presents opportunities to add migration to livelihood constellations.

#### **SF5: Many types of migration (e.g., economic, environmental, conflict) lead to managed migration**

This is more of a dialectical than linear relationship, in that managed migration can initiate migrations flows between two regions that then transform into migration that occurs outside of systems of state surveillance, as occurred when

Temporary Protected Status migration stimulated much larger flows of undocumented migrants from Honduras to the United States following Hurricane Mitch (Griffith, 2020). So too can refugee and other migrant flows morph into state managed migration, as in the case of Somali migrants to the United Arab Emirates (Thiollet, 2011). Managed migration typically involves foreign contract labour schemes – commonly called guestworker programs – that recruit foreign workers to provide economic services; from guestworkers' perspectives, managed migration often provides access to migration opportunities they would not be able to afford, given that employers in host countries usually advance their transportation expenses (Griffith, 2006, 2022; Hahamovitch, 2003). However, states or corporate interests can co-opt migrants – whether economic, environmental, or conflict migrants – to work as guestworkers in their host regions or countries. Thiollet (2011) argues, for example, that migration in the Middle East, from conflict zones into oil-rich, developing economies, fell under the rubric of “a political management of migration flows.” This is not uncommon. In Germany, government programs set up to issue temporary documents to refugees are often housed in the same offices where the unemployed seek work and social support; classes in German, certification for trades, and other programs attempt to “manage” refugees by directing them towards gainful employment (Kogan, 2006).

## MIGRATION PATTERNS

### SF6: Migration is less common than staying put

This has been a human pattern since the rise of cities and states, in that centralized governments tend to prefer peoples to be sedentary rather than mobile, providing labour services and tax revenue; this has been true historically under feudalism, plantation agriculture and other economic systems that require large resident labour forces. As such, there are political economic reasons for this, as well as sentiments that, culturally, build on attachment to place (Schewel, 2019). Today, under 4% of the world's population live in countries other than those in which they were born; even if we triple that with IDPs, it still accounts for under 15% of the world's peoples (United Nations, 2017). Given that a minority migrate even in cases without barriers to mobility, it appears that most migration initially occurs not because of opportunities elsewhere, but from an erosion of opportunities in one's homeland.

### SF7. Natural environmental, conflict and economic migration are only three of many types of human migration

We have already suggested the existence of multiple types of migration in our discussion of SF3 above. In addition to those mentioned, other types include nomadism, transhumance, merchant couriers, contract labour schemes and vagabonds or drifters (Castel, 2003). Often these derive from migration traditions, although conflict and crisis migration quite often precedes their development (Balcells, 2018; Bohnet et al., 2018; Massey & Silva, 2014). Even when migration appears as a refugee flow in response to crisis, migration may in fact be a regular response to fluctuations in economic opportunities or ecological services (Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011; Naess, 2013). In such cases, environmental migration often relates to and becomes entangled with other forms of human mobility, some of which are historical and largely connected to livelihoods (e.g. African pastoralists who have had to contend with intense variability in availability of water and pasture – Schnegg & Kiaka, 2019; Naess, 2013).

### SF8. Migration is uneven across peoples and geographies

Based on the wider social phenomena of inequality, migration occurs unevenly across social groups and geographical regions, usually related to access to natural and social resources (Black et al., 2011). Internal displacement occurs

because the environmental forcing conditions – whether from conflict, disaster, climate change, or degraded livelihoods – are often regionally uneven, with some areas suffering more than others. Further, some populations (e.g. farming, fishing) are highly dependent on natural resources while others are less so. This has led to the emergence of regions within nations, like Idlib in Syria, that become, for a time, sanctuaries to people fleeing crisis, becoming home to millions of IDPs from the civil war in other parts of the country (Hunter et al., 2015). In so far as the unevenness of migration derives from social inequality and uneven access to natural and social resources, that unevenness fluctuates along with economic livelihoods.

Quite obviously, environmental migration occurs among those with livelihoods tied to natural resources more than those, say, with urban, wage labour-based or entrepreneurial livelihoods (Marchiori et al., 2011; Wrathall, 2012). By contrast, the seasonal dimensions of natural resource-based livelihoods may encourage complex livelihood constellations, making some households less vulnerable to disasters than others. Conflict migration varies along with differences in the character of combatants (e.g., state-sponsored, rebels, ethnic/successionist). Finally, migration researchers studying economic migration have long known that it occurs most commonly among middle-income households rather than the very poor or the very wealthy (Bray, 1984). The very poor often do not have the finances to move and the very wealthy often have too much to lose by leaving.

### SF9. Short-distance and short-duration migration are more common than long

Internal migration and displacement are far more common than international migration, and more likely to be of short duration, or temporary, than resulting in permanent resettlement (UNHCR 2017; Ravenstein, 1889). Many migration researchers have noted how international migrants begin as target earners with three- to five-year plans but, once abroad, continue extending their time away from home (Mahler, 1995; Menjivar, 2000). Migrants who invest in long-distance, international migration are less likely to return home quickly than those who move to nearby regions. The finding that around three times as many internally displaced persons as international refugees flee conflict or disaster is further evidence that people prefer to remain in their home countries, but also reflects a lack of resources to travel far. Some have posited a relationship between the resources that households have and the distance and length of migration, with wealthier households able to travel further, for longer time periods, than poorer households: a correlation, in short, among distance, duration and livelihood (Bohra-Mishra & Massey, 2011).

### SF10. Households, as repositories of age and gender relations, influence the composition of migrant populations

Forty years ago, Charles Wood (1982) argued that the household was the optimal unit of analysis in migration studies, situated at the crossroads of structural conditions like social class and individual decision-making (Pessar, 1982). Similarly, Stark and Bloom (1985), elaborating a “new economics of labour migration,” viewed households and families as the principal decision-making units that influence who in the family migrates, where they go, how long they stay, etc. Further, households embody social relations of age and gender that influence migration. Like class, caste, race and other social roles, age and gender relations, as part of power relations, structure opportunities for migration. Economic migration, designed to add to household income, usually involves the most employable family members – that is, younger, more productive individuals and more highly skilled individuals, whether male or female (Freeman, 2001; Parreñas, 2000; Stark & Bloom, 1985). By contrast, conflict and environmental migration are more likely to include the very young, very old and males and females. Indeed, it is often concern for the young, old, infirm and other more vulnerable members of households that drives flight from areas where hospitals, schools, markets, roads and other infrastructure have been damaged. Following Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico, with most schools closed shortly after the start of the academic school year, families placed high priority on sending school-aged children to the U.S.



mainland, principally New York and Florida (Lloréns, 2018; Meléndez & Hinojosa, 2017). Similar concerns arose for those requiring medical care (e.g. dialysis patients) and life-sustaining drugs such as insulin.

Who stays behind and who leaves influences the character of livelihood constellations at home and the development of new livelihoods in transit or in receiving locations. How livelihoods are affected, however, depends on pre-existing cultural norms regarding work, division of labour based on age and gender, skills, availability of occupational training and other economic practices and ideas. Peoples who come from specific economic traditions (e.g. pastoralists, merchants, peasants) often share similar ideas regarding appropriate economic roles in households, often expressed as moral economics (Scott, 1977). These may be challenged, however, in cases where age and gender relations undergo significant changes outside the homeland, as Abdi (2014) reports for Somali families in Minnesota.

### SF11. Livelihood constellations that include environmental migration reflect nature-society relationships, including ecosystem services

Considering livelihoods is particularly important in understanding environmental migration that reflects deep nature-society relationships in that many migrants depend on natural resources. In such cases, migration is related to ecosystem services, particularly where environmental migration has become a traditional part of commodity production and peasant or pastoralist livelihoods (Collins, 1988; Kardulias, 2015) or where people come from economies based on forestry, fisheries, or other natural resources. Clearly, for example, the seasonal migrations of agro-pastoral peoples for water and pasture constitute long valued forms of environmental migration. Ecosystem services are important to our understanding of conflict migration only in so far as the conflict either prevents access to key natural resources or contaminates natural resources so badly that they can no longer provide former ecosystem services (Linke & Ruether, 2021).

### SOMALI MIGRATION IN LIGHT OF STYLIZED FACTS (SFS)

Somalia challenges conventional understandings of environmental migration in that its agro-pastoral livelihoods – central to most Somali peoples – have, historically, combined nomadic movements across ecosystems and across international borders to access water and pasture for their principal economic assets: livestock. Mere living thus combined environmental and economic migration, as seasonal migration was (and is) an integral component of livelihood constellations based in pastoralism (Kardulias, 2015). In a similar vein, Lindley (2010:4) notes in an article on Somalia that “viewed from the micro-level, threats to people’s lives and livelihoods are often hard to distinguish from one another.” Some have argued, too, that migration among Somalis is “based on the Somali notion of *buufis*, a deep-felt desire for onward migration, whose nonfulfillment can potentially result in mental disorders” (Ikanda, 2018). This is similar to Abdi’s (2015) findings concerning the persistent search for *Jannah* (or paradise) among Somalis throughout the Somali diaspora, which stimulates continual mobility. In her book on Somali mobility within Europe, Moret (2018) argues that, after leaving Somalia, many Somalis engage in other types of migration in response to political economic developments in Europe; Moret adds that the cultural imagery of nomadism is more of a way of casting migration in a positive light than a cause for continued migration. Whether tied to pastoralist livelihoods, political economic developments, culturally ingrained ideas (or all three), Somalia’s migration traditions are historically deep, varied and complex, with one type of migration often leading to other types (SF1, SF3 & SF7).

Yet more concrete, immediate reasons for Somali migration are tied to environmental degradation and personal security (Lindley, 2010). Somalia has experienced a civil war (1987–1991), UN intervention from 1992 to 1995, and the more recent violence spawned by Al-Shabaab and its enemies beginning in 2009 and lasting to the present. Based on 2015–16 UN data, within Somalia, five regions (Shabelle Dhexe, Gedo, Hiraan, Juba Hoose and Awdal) have been recipients of IDPs that range from just a few to over 40,000. Around half arrived before 2015 and half since 2015. Only around 14% of the IDPs are fleeing districts other than those where they lived, suggesting that over 80% of



IDPs travel short distances (<400 km) (SF9), although the length and time of these treks depend on geography and infrastructure.

Shabelle Dhexe, a coastal district immediately north of Mogadishu, has the most IDPs and Gedo, a district in the southwest that borders Kenya, has the second highest. These and two of the other three IDP districts are in southern and south-central Somalia, close to regions that have experienced the most devastating droughts, famines, flooding and conflict. There were major famines in 1992 and 2011–12 and drought in 2016–17. More recently, the Hiraa district has witnessed significant flooding.

Only between 18% and 21% of IDPs reside in refugee camps or collective housing arrangements, however, which suggests that around 80% live with relatives, host clans, or have made other arrangements with private landowners/landlords, often through highly exploitative “gatekeepers.” Yarnell (2019) reports that these gatekeepers serve as intermediaries between landlords/landowners and IDPs, negotiating terms of settlement whereby IDPs give over portions of the aid they receive from the Red Cross, the United Nations, or other organizations, demonstrating that the humanitarian economy has assumed an important role in Somali livelihood constellations as well as in Somalia's migration economy.

These districts also have IDPs who have returned from their displacement, ranging from 0 to over 5000, and around 20% of the districts also have international refugees who have returned from abroad. These populations movements are in line with Avis's and Herbert's (2016: 1) opening comment that, “Somalia is a country of origin, destination, transit and return for a large number of people moving across the Horn of Africa region and beyond” (SF7). Just across the border from Gedo, inside Kenya, are several refugee camps known collectively as the Dadaab Complex and include Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo2, Hagadera and Kambioos. These camps are located in areas where ethnic Somalis have lived as Kenyan citizens since colonial times and are known as staging areas for continued migration to more desirable locations, particularly Minnesota in the United States (Abdi, 2015), further confirming that one type of migration can lead to other types (SF3).

Somalis have connections to transnational communities that span at least three countries that border Somalia – Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti – and at least four others: South Africa, Yemen, United Arab Emirates and the United States (Abdi, 2015; Clapman, 2017; Ikanda, 2018; Lewis, 1994; Moret, 2018). The connections to their three immediate neighbours derive from the historical Somali territories of nomadic herders, which paid little attention to international boundaries during the colonial era. After the African independence movements of the 1960s, however, the Organization for African Unity, in concert with the concerns of former European colonial powers, tightened borders as the new states sought to consolidate their status as emergent, autonomous nation-states. Such tightening of borders can be viewed as state resistance to migration (SF2), which is not much different from common attempts by nation-states to force pastoralists to become more sedentary (Kardulias, 2015; Ptáčková, 2020). This resulted in some ethnic Somalis being included in the new neighbouring states. Somalis in refugee camps in Kenya share many linguistic and cultural traits with local Kenyan Somalis – so much that some Kenyan Somalis attempt to pass themselves off as refugees in attempts to emigrate to the United States and other desired locations (Ikanda, 2018).

In addition to a long history of nomadism, which is central to the identity of many Somalis, during the 1970s and 1980s, between 65,000 and over 200,000 Somalis from the northern region emigrated to the oil-producing nations of the United Arab Emirates to work in petroleum, initiating managed migration (SF5) (Lewis, 1994: 122). This migration generated remittances that became important sources of foreign exchange for Somali merchants and traders, who negotiated with Somali families who had workers in the UAE to trade foreign currency for Somali currency or the merchants' or traders' goods. As noted in the opening paragraph, Somali remittance recipients used funds to construct small reservoirs for watering livestock, which contributed to less internal migration in the form of nomadism. Clearly, these strategies reflected long-term nature-society relationships, including Somali dependence on ecosystem services (SF11). Lewis also reports the UAE-bound emigration caused a shortage of young, able-bodied men to work in traditional herding occupations, opening up some local opportunities for other young men to tend the livestock of wealthier kinsmen. Because the labour migrants and hired herdsmen were predominantly male, reflecting Somali gender relations (SF10), this migration increased the workloads and responsibilities of women and children.

To environmental, economic and conflict migration traditions, we add a fourth based on racism and injustice, further adding to the complexity of Somali migration (SF7). Bantu-speaking peoples, most brought to Somalia as slaves from other parts of Africa, have been marginalized in Somalia for many decades. Tracing their roots to other African nations, including Kenya and Tanzania, they are ethnically and physically distinct from Somalis, not part of the dominant Somali lineages, number around half a million, are concentrated in Somali's rich agricultural region of the Juba River Valley and develop livelihood constellations from agriculture rather than pastoralism. Since 1999, Somali Bantus have been resettled to the United States, where they continue to be distinct from ethnic Somalis, a fact that can confuse U.S. social workers (Lehman & Eno, 2003). In response to persecution in Somalia, they have sought asylum in several African countries as well as the United States and Europe, achieving the most success in Tanzania, where most of them trace their origins.

Somali diasporas have been common at least since the political instability and conflict beginning in the late 1980s and lasting until today, but likely pre-date Somali independence, thus influencing migrant destinations (SF1). Like many East African nomadic herders, Somalis are organized along patrilineal lines, ideally tracing heritage and ties of loyalty to clans, clan-families, lineages, *dia-paying* groups and elders through one's father's line. These relations influence the compositions of Somali households and migrant populations (SF10). *Dia-paying* groups are central to indigenous Somali political structure, in that these are the lineage sub-groups that people turn to for livelihood opportunities, political alliances, security and in matters of law and arbitration. Movement among *dia-paying* groups has been part of a common Somali economic strategy to access different economic and political resources that builds on ties of patrilineage and other family connections, adding to household livelihood constellations (Lewis, 1994).

Although Somalis are patrilineal in the ideal, in reality, ties and loyalties often also recognize uterine ties – the mother's lineage – through a common process known as complimentary filiation, or the recognition of rights attached to one's "opposite" lineage – or one "opposed" via marriage – through one's mother and maternal uncle (Lewis, 1994). Complimentary filiation has been adaptive in Somali history because of the flexibility of the indigenous Somali political system, which was highly democratic and open to people moving among different *dia-paying* groups across different patrilineages based on ecological and economic developments and livelihood strategies. As Ikanda (2018: 570–571) says: "The distribution of relatives in multiple places is seemingly aligned to Somali kinship organizing principles that typically entail the forming and breaking of groups. However, unlike the segmentary lineage logic that was informed by the need for self-defence and economic survival, current group dynamics appear to have been shaped by practical realities of seeking better economic prospects away from the harsh camp conditions." These practical realities would also reduce and diversify risk and add to livelihood constellations (SF4).

These observations provide further support for the idea that migration practices build on past traditions (SF1), although in this case the traditional practice is, on the one hand, associated with environmental migration (nomadic herding) and, on the other, based on the uneven dispersion of kinship ties across wider social, ecological and economic fields (SF8, SF10, SF11). It is not insignificant that many ties among clans have been established and cemented through marriage, which often involves the exchange of women between families where gender relations remain highly patriarchal. Somali consistently ranks among the lowest countries in terms of gender equity (UNDP, 2012). This has led to strained relations between women and men across the Somali diaspora in cases where women assert their autonomy in places like Minnesota, where access to government payments, police protection and other services have allowed women to resist male domination, leading to the joke among Somali men that there is "a hierarchy of rights granted to individuals in America: women first, children second, pets third, and men last" (Abdi, 2014: 470). Despite what Abdi calls "gendered opportunities" for women to resist patriarchy, her conclusions suggest that gender relations across the Somali diaspora continue to replicate those common in Somalia (SF10).

Finally, although migration is common in Somalia and among Somalis living in Europe and elsewhere, a minority of Somalis are migrants, confirming that it is still more common for people to remain in their home communities than migrate (SF6). However, it may not be long before Somalis become one of the first nations where more of its citizens reside outside its borders than in the country; from 1995 to 2015, Somali migrants rose from under 900,000 to around 2,000,000, or around one fifth of the total population (Pew Research Center, 2016). If we add an additional

2.9 million internally displaced Somalis, we are close to crossing the threshold where more Somalis live outside of Somalia than inside (UNHCR, 2022). As these trends continue, Al-Shebab and other perpetrators of violence may find themselves presiding over a land barren of people.

## CONCLUSION: LIVELIHOOD CONSTELLATIONS, MIGRATION TRADITIONS AND MIGRATION THEORY

Early in this paper, we noted that Somali migration included centuries-old migration traditions and more recent migrant and refugee flows related to conflict, environmental change, economic precarity at home and security and livelihood opportunities abroad. Its complex migration profile both challenges and reinforces our stylized facts while offering support to the idea that livelihood constellations provide insight into how Somalis incorporate migration into their lives. Through livelihood constellations, Somalis have established connections among several regions as well as many “economies.” One of these, the migration economy, facilitates continued migration and refugee flows, even if those flows result in deportation from receiving nations, exploitation by urban gatekeepers for housing, or forced return from receiving regions. Figure 1 shows just a few of economies that Somalis connect with their labour, their migration and their livelihood constellations.

As we intend to make clear with the figure, these “economies” are not separate, autonomous entities but interlocking and overlapping economic formations that provide Somali livelihood opportunities for Somalis; they depend on inputs of Somali time, labour, capital and ecosystem services, channelling, providing and constraining economic opportunity. As such, they reflect livelihood constellations and offer insights into how these livelihoods connect different economic formations, influencing flows of labour, ideas, international aid and other goods and services.




FIGURE 1 Somali Economic Formations.

Again, as household or clan members engage in one livelihood, that engagement influences the time and effort that can be devoted to other livelihoods in the constellation and, equally important, influences whose time and effort, specifically, contributes to the maintenance of this or that livelihood. Women? Children? Unpaid lineage members? Hired herders? The elderly? Which individuals or groups provide labour to different livelihoods can tell us a good deal about how Somalis and other groups rooted in agro-pastoral traditions value their labour and livelihoods, in that to whom people allocate tasks reflects how they rank those tasks in terms of prestige, satisfaction, potential for generating income and other dimensions.

It is well documented that many agro-pastoral peoples attach supreme value to livestock and the labour associated with its care, well-being and reproduction (Evans-Pritchard 1939; Griffith et al., 2016; Human Relation Area Files, 2019; Lewis, 1994; Kardulias, 2015). Today this value has been enhanced as livestock meet income and food needs for armed forces during civil conflict (Clapman, 2017; Wild et al., 2018). Given the high values attached to livestock, acquiring or improving an individual's or a family's (or clan's) livestock holdings has often been a stimulus for labour migration (Lewis, 1994). Yet emigration inevitably involves reallocating labour within and between households, often leading to increasing burdens on women and children while increasing household need for hired herders (UNDP, 2015). These developments may influence gender and age relations at home in much the same way that women's access to services in Minnesota increases their status and power there (Abdi, 2014).

Further, these observations may not be restricted to Somalia but may be common among agro-pastoralist groups across northern Africa and elsewhere. Most if not all agro-pastoralist groups come from long histories of *environmental* migration based on the seasonal movement of livestock for sources of pasture and water and these movements often cross international borders (Kardulias, 2015). At the same time, international data on internally displaced persons due to conflict include a disproportionate number of individuals from African, Middle Eastern, Asian and Latin American nations with long histories of and large contemporary populations involved in agro-pastoralism (Fransen & de Haas, 2022; IDMC, 2021). This suggests that many agro-pastoralist peoples, in Africa and elsewhere, engage in *conflict* migration, most likely from defending migration routes as national governments tighten borders and encourage settlement and as armed forces steal livestock (Wild et al., 2018).

Combined, both environmental and conflict migration have led to multiple attempts to manage these migration flows in ways that channel migrants and refugees into new and old livelihoods, stimulating *economic* migration and, again, demonstrating that many forms of migration, and many livelihoods, are linked to one another – either causally or dialectically. This has important implications for migration theory. Specifically, during the 1990s, as noted above, several anthropologists and sociologists introduced and elaborated the concept of transnationalism, noting that international migration often created diasporas that then became dynamic forces in connections between sending and receiving nations (e.g., Basch et al., 1995; Levitt, 2001; Menjivar, 2000). Subsequent ethnographic and survey work has shown that transnationalism has been a powerful force in people's lives in many countries highly dependent on migration and remittances in their livelihood constellations. However, the dominance of transnationalism in the migration literature has overshadowed several key facts about migration: that the majority of the world's migrants never cross an international boundary, that many refugees are forced to cut ties to their homelands and that multiple causes and consequences of migration are possible. Viewing migration through the lens of livelihood constellations neutralizes the possibility of privileging one type of migration over another, viewing migration itself as an addition to a livelihood constellation regardless of whether it is international, internal, conflict, environmental, economic, or the result of powerful social ties, cultural traditions and sentiments emanating from one's diaspora.

In summary, our observations in Somalia and among other agro-pastoral peoples, combined with the migration processes and patterns outlined in our stylized facts, highlight the potential of the livelihood constellations concept to illuminate migration research, practice and policy. Specifically, as households and communities develop and elaborate their livelihood constellations, they point to key variables to include in research projects, offer ideas to others regarding how to include migration in a livelihood constellation, alert international aid workers involved in migration and refugee movements to important components of migrants' identities and lifestyles and suggest political and diplomatic mechanisms to enhance connections among economic formations that fortify existing livelihoods in ways

that lead to more positive environmental and social outcomes. Further, the same key social structural components that enable human migration – households, communities, social networks and diasporas – also create linkages among livelihoods and economic formations in livelihood constellations. Profiling and investigating these constellations can, therefore, address issues related to the scale of human migration as micro-level economic activities take on international importance in the movements of the peoples of the world.

## PEER REVIEW

The peer review history for this article is available at <https://publons.com/publon/10.1111/imig.13122>.

## DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.

## ORCID

David Griffith  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6103-6061>

## REFERENCES

- Abdi, C. (2014) Threatened identities and gendered opportunities: Somali migration to America. *Signs*, 39(2), 459–483.
- Abdi, C. (2015) *Elusive Jannah: the Somali diaspora and borderless Muslim identity*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Avis, W. & Herbert, S. (2016) *Rapid fragility and migration assessment for Somalia*. Birmingham: GSDRC University of Birmingham.
- Balcells, L. (2018) Dynamics of internal resettlement during civil war: evidence from Catalonia (1936–39). *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(2), 236–251.
- Basch, L., Glick-Schiller, N. & Blanc, C.S. (1995) *Nations unbound: transnationalism, post-colonial predicaments, and deterritorialized nation states*. London: Routledge.
- Black, R., Adger, W.N., Arnell, N.W., Dercon, S., Geddes, A. & Thomas, D. (2011) The effect of environmental change on human migration. *Global Environmental Change*, 21, S3–S11.
- Bohnet, H., Cottier, F. & Hug, S. (2018) Conflict-induced IDPs and the spread of conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(4), 691–716.
- Bohra-Mishra, P. & Massey, D.S. (2011) Individual decisions to migrate during civil conflict. *Demography*, 48(2), 401–424.
- Bray, D. (1984) Economic development: the middle class and international migration in The Dominican Republic. *International Migration Review*, 18(2), 217–236.
- Castel, R. (2003) *From manual workers to wage laborers: transformation of the social question*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Clapman, C. (2017) *The horn of Africa: state formation and decay*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Collins, J. (1988) *Unseasonal migrations: the effects of rural labor scarcity in Peru*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ellis, F. (2000) *Rural livelihoods and diversity in developing countries*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1939) *The Nuer: a description of a Nilotic people*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Fassin, D. (2007) Humanitarianism as a politics of life. *Public Culture*, 19(3), 499–520.
- Feldman, D. (2007) Global movements, internal migration, and the importance of institutions. *International Review of Social History*, 52(1), 105–109.
- Fransen, S. & de Haas, H. (2022) Trends and patterns of global refugee migration. *Population and Development Review*, 48(1), 97–128.
- Freeman, C. (2001) Is local: global as feminine: masculine? Rethinking the Gender of Globalization. *Signs*, 26(4), 1007–1037.
- Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. & Sorensen, N.N. (Eds.). (2013) *The migration industry and the commercialization of international migration*. New York: Routledge.
- Griffith, D. (2006) *American Guestworkers: Jamaicans and Mexicans in the U.S. labor market*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Griffith, D. (2020) Environmental change and human migration: stylized facts from Puerto Rico and Honduras. *Coastal Management*, 48(5), 398–417.
- Griffith, D. (2021) Labor in livelihood constellations across Coastal Plains. *The Anthropology of Work Review XLII*, 2, 82–92.
- Griffith, D. (2022) *The cultural value of work: livelihoods and migration in the World's economies*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Griffith, D., Isuala, R., Torres, P. & Cruz, M.V. (2016) Migration, labor scarcity, and deforestation in Honduran cattle country. *Journal of Ecological Anthropology*, 18(1), 1–16.

- Hahamovitch, C. (2003) Creating perfect immigrants: guestworkers of the world in historical perspective 1. *Labor History*, 44(1), 69–94.
- Hahamovitch, C. (2011) *No Man's land: Jamaican guestworkers in America and the global history of deportable labor*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hauer, M.E., Holloway, S.R. & Oda, T. (2020) Evacuees and migrants exhibit different migration systems after the great East Japan earthquake and tsunami. *Demography*, 57, 1437–1457.
- Hear, V., Nicolas, O.B. & Long, K. (2018) Push-pull plus: reconsidering the drivers of migration. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(6), 927–944. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1384135>
- Hernández-León, R. (2013) Conceptualizing the migration industry. In: *The migration industry and the commercialization of international migration*. New York: Routledge, pp. 42–62.
- Hirschman, D. (2016) Stylized facts in the social sciences. *Sociological Science*, 3, 604–626.
- Human Relation Area Files. (2019) New Haven, CT: Yale University.
- Hunter, L.M., Luna, J.K. & Norton, R.M. (2015) Environmental dimensions of migration. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 41, 377–397.
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). (2021) *Internal Displacement Index*. Available from: [www.internal-displacement.org](http://www.internal-displacement.org)
- Ikanda, F.N. (2018) Somali refugees in Kenya and social resilience: resettlement imaginings and the longing for Minnesota. *African Affairs*, 117(469), 569–591.
- Kardulias, P.N. (Ed.). (2015) *The ecology of pastoralism*. Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado.
- King, R., Skeldon, R. & Vullnetari, J. (2008) Internal and international migration: bridging the theoretical divide. Working Paper 52. Sussex Centre for Migration Research, University of Sussex.
- Kogan, I. (2006) Labor markets and economic incorporation among recent immigrants in Europe. *Social Forces*, 85(2), 697–721.
- Lehman, D.V. & Eno, O. (2003) The Somali bantu: their history and culture. *Culture Profile*.
- Levitt, P. (2001) *Transnational villagers*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lewis, I. (1994) *Blood and bone: the call of kinship in Somali society*. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press.
- Lindley, A. (2010) Leaving Mogadishu: towards a sociology of conflict-related mobility. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 23(1), 4–22.
- Linke, A.M. & Ruether, B. (2021) Weather, wheat, and war: security implications of climate variability for conflict in Syria. *Journal of Peace Research*, 58(1), 114–131.
- Lloréns, H. (2018) Ruin nation: In Puerto Rico, Hurricane Maria laid bare the results of a long-term crisis created by dispossession, migration, and economic predation. *NACLA Report on the Americas*, 50(2), 154–159.
- Mahler, S.J. (1995) *American dreaming: immigrant life on the margins*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Marchiori, L., Maystadt, J.F. & Schumacher, I. (2011) *The impact of climate variations on migration in sub-Saharan Africa*. In Proceedings of the CSAE 25th Anniversary Conference.
- Massey, D.S. & España, F.G. (1987) The social process of international migration. *Science*, 237(4816), 733–738.
- Massey, D.S. & Silva, A.C. (2014) Violence, networks, and international migration from Colombia. *International Migration*, 53, 1–17.
- Meléndez, E. & Hinojosa, J. (2017) *Estimates of post-hurricane Maria exodus from Puerto Rico*. Research Brief Centro RB2017-01. New York, NY: Center for Puerto Rican Studies, pp. 1–7.
- Menjívar, C. (2000) *Fragmented ties: Salvadoran immigrant networks in America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Moret, J. (2018) *European Somalis' post-migration movements: mobility capital and the Transnationalisation of resources*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Open.
- Naess, M.W. (2013) Climate change, risk management and the end of Nomadic pastoralism. *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology*, 20(2), 123–133.
- Oliver-Smith, A. (2010) *Defying displacement: grassroots resistance and the critique of development*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Oliver-Smith, A. (2012) Debating environmental migration: society, nature and population displacement in climate change. *Journal of International Development*, 24(8), 1058–1070.
- Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (2011) *Development co-operation report*.
- Parreñas, R.S. (2000) Migrant Filipina domestic workers and the international division of reproductive labor. *Gender & Society*, 14(4), 560–580.
- Pessar, P. (1982) The role of households in international migration and the case of U.S.-bound migration from the Dominican Republic. *International Migration Review*, 16(2), 24–36.
- Pew Research Center. (2016) *5 facts about the global Somali diaspora*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/01/5-facts-about-the-global-somali-diaspora/> [Accessed 8 December 2022]
- Ptáčková, J. (2020) *Exile from the grasslands: Tibetan herders and Chinese development projects*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Ravenstein, E.G. (1889) The Laws of migration. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 52(2), 241–305.



- Schewel, K. (2019) Understanding immobility: moving beyond the mobility bias in migration studies. *International Migration Review*, 54, 328–355.
- Schnegg, M. & Kiaka, R.D. (2019) The economic value of water: the contradictions and consequences of a prominent development model in Namibia. *Economic Anthropology*, 6(2), 264–276. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1002/sea2.12152>
- Schon, J. (2020) *Surviving the war in Syria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schon, J. & Johnson, J.C. (2021) How interstate amity and animosity complement migration networks to drive migration flows: a multi-layer network analysis, 1991–2016. *PLoS One*, 16(1), e0245712. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0245712>
- Scott, J.C. (1977) *The moral economy of the peasant: rebellion and subsistence in Southeast Asia*. Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shervinin, A., Grace, K., McDermid, S., van der Geest, K., Puma, M. & Bell, A. (2022) Migration theory in climate mobility research. *Frontiers in Climate*, 4, 8882343.
- Stark, O. & Bloom, D. (1985) The new economics of labor migration. *American Economic Review*, 75(2), 173–178.
- Thiollet, H. (2011) Migration as diplomacy: labor migrants, refugees, and Arab regional politics in the oil-rich countries. *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 79(1), 103–121.
- Tilghman, L.M. (2019) Matoy jirofo, Masaka lavany: rural–urban migrants' livelihood strategies through the lens of the clove commodity cycle in Madagascar. *Economic Anthropology*, 6(1), 48–60.
- United Nations. (2017) International migration report.
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2012) Annual Report.
- United Nations Development Program (UNDP). (2015) Gender in Somalia.
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. (2022) Somalia Internal Displacement. <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/horn/location/192> [Accessed 8 December 2022]
- Wampler, B. (2020) Annual country index with new food dependency data reflects vulnerability to climate change. <http://gain.nd.edu>
- Whitaker, B.E. (2020) Refugees, foreign nationals, and Wageni: comparing African responses to Somali migration. *African Studies Review*, 63(1), 21–34.
- Wild, H., Jok, J.M. & Patel, R. (2018) The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan: how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, 3(2), 1–11.
- Wood, C.H. (1982) Equilibrium and historical-structural perspectives on migration. *International Migration Review*, 16(2), 298–319.
- Wrathall, D.J. (2012) Migration amidst social-ecological regime shift: the search for stability in Garifuna villages of northern Honduras. *Human Ecology*, 40(4), 583–596.
- Yarnell, M. (2019) *Durable Solutions in Somalia: moving from policies to practice for IDPs in Mogadishu*. Refugees International Field Report.

**How to cite this article:** Griffith, D., Muneeppeerakul, R., Guerry, G., Cabrero, A.C., Johnson, J.C., Munoz-Carpena, R., Puma, M., Lall, U. & Homayounfar, M. (2023) Migration and livelihood constellations: Assessing common themes in the face of environmental change in Somalia and among Agro-Pastoral peoples. *International Migration*, 00, 1–15. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13122>